The Swedish Security Service (Säkerhetspolisen) has mapped and acted against a Russian intelligence operation aimed at influencing Swedish decision-making and discrediting Sweden, the European Union and NATO. The Russian operation was conducted, among other means, through an agent from a foreign diplomatic mission in Sweden.
The Russian intelligence operation had been planned and directed over an extended period by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). The operation included obtaining information about Swedish decision-making processes to enable the Russian intelligence service to conduct influence operations on polarising issues. The objective was to undermine Swedish decision-making and discredit Sweden, the EU and NATO.
Through its intelligence work, the Swedish Security Service has been able to map how the Russian intelligence operation was conducted and how the activities were carried out in Sweden.
“When the Swedish Security Service became aware of the attempts at influence, we acted to protect vital Swedish security interests and counter further influence. This case shows that Russian intelligence and security services continue to prioritise traditional intelligence operations by recruiting human sources and agents, who in turn act and attempt to influence others. The Swedish Security Service views this security-threatening activity with the utmost seriousness,” says Christoffer Wedelin, Deputy Head of Operations at the Swedish Security Service.
Russia Maintaining Long-Term Intelligence Operations
Foreign powers, and Russia in particular, possess significant capabilities and operate with a long-term perspective in pursuit of the regime’s objectives.
Russian intelligence activities are particularly focused on information concerning Swedish political positions and Sweden’s work within NATO and the EU. They also target Sweden’s support for Ukraine and the country’s military capabilities.
Influence operations are also directed towards polarising issues with the aim of undermining Swedish or European decision-making.
“The handling of the foreign agent has been ongoing for an extended period using covert methods. Among other things, the agent was tasked with obtaining information so that the Russian intelligence service could influence and discredit Swedish decision-making. The Swedish Security Service has been able to follow in detail how the meetings were conducted and what was discussed,” says Christoffer Wedelin, Deputy Head of Operations at the Swedish Security Service.
Facts About Agent Recruitment
The recruitment of agents often takes place in several stages, with intelligence officers from foreign intelligence and security services establishing contact with an individual.
If you believe you have been targeted in an attempted recruitment operation, make a note of who contacted you, when and how the initial contact was made, and the reason the individual gave for making contact.
You should then contact the Swedish Security Service, even if you are uncertain whether you have actually been targeted.
People in Sweden are approached in recruitment attempts every year.